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As a second ground for the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained
by federal officers, it could be argued that the Court should adopt a
judicial policy barring all evidence illegally obtained by state or federal
officers as a means of suppressing illegal search and seizure within the
state. Such a policy might be deemed warranted on the basis of modern
developments in this area and on the basis of G. S. § 15-27 as indicative
of legislative intent in this direction. This would go further than the
federal rule which excludes only evidence illegally obtained by federal
agents.
As a third basis for declaring inadmissible in North Carolina evi-
dence unlawfully obtained by federal officers, it could be urged that a
rule excluding the same should be adopted as the most effective means
by which the Court can discharge its obligation to uphold the fourth
amendment. As has been mentioned previously, this argument has been
adopted by some of the courts which have acted on the question.
Without regard to the alternative merits of the bases suggested
above for declaring inadmissible in the state courts evidence unlawfully
acquired by federal officer's, it is to be hoped that North Carolina will
exclude such evidence should the question arise. The suppression of
illegal search and seizure by federal agents can be rendered truly
effective only by making it known in advance that any evidence taken
in an illegal manner will be inadmissible in proving the guilt of the ac-
cused in either state or federal criminal proceedings.
JAMES C. Fox.
Constitutional Law-Requisites of Notice of Governmental Action
The United States- Supreme Court cast new light on the requisites of
notice under the due process clause of the Constitution in the recent
decision of Walker v. City of Hutchinson.' The defendant city, in the
exercise of its statutory power of eminent domain,2 condemned property
of the plaintiff for purposes of street widening. In accordance with the
provision of the statute, the property owners were notified by publication
that the hearing was to be held to determine compensation.3 The Court
found that the notice provided by the act was not reasonably calculated
to inform a known resident landowner of condemnation proceedings
against his property, and, therefore, that Fourteenth Amendment require-
quirements of due process of law were not met. "Even a letter," it was
'352 U. S. 112 (1956).
-K.A. GEN. STAT. § 26-202 (1949).
'In accordance with the statute, there was one published notice given in the
official city newspaper ten days before the hearing. The Court, however, laid no
stress on this point, but based its decision upon the inadequacy of notice by publica-
tion generally when some better means of giving notice is readily available.
[Vol. 35
NOTES AND COMMENTS
said, "would have apprised him that his property was about to be
taken." 4
Upon the rationale of Justice Miller's widely cited dicta in Davidson
v. New Orleans,5 the Court has repeatedly sanctioned notice by publica-
tion in actions growing out of the powers of government. 6 This was a
lower standard of notice than that imposed on others in comparable ac-
tions, but was considered justified and necessary for the expeditous
handling of state business.7 On this basis, notice by publication has
been approved where the state was exercising its powers of eminent
domain or taxing functions.8 The Walker opinion, however, states
broadly and unmistakably that there is nothing peculiar about govern-
mental actions which justify depriving citizens of the right to be heard.0
In discussing this proposition, Justice Black observed that often notice
published in a newspaper is no notice at all, and that a more stringent
requirement will prevent one-sided fixing of compensation by govern-
ment officials. Answering Justice Miller's argument, the Court said
it did not believe that compliance with this requirement would interfere
with orderly condemnation proceedings.
Further indication of a policy change in notice requirements was
given in Covey v. Town of Somers.10 The Court held invalid that part
of a New York statute" which provided that written notice to any tax-
payer, including minors and incompetents, was sufficient for judicial
foreclosure of tax liens in all cases. The authorities, it was said, knew
'Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112, 115 (1956).
96 U. S. 97, 104 (1878). "That whenever by the laws of a State, or by State
authority, a tax, assessment, servitude, or other burden is imposed upon property
for the public use, whether it be for the whole State or of some more limited portion
of the community, and those laws provide for a mode of confirming or contesting the
charge thus imposed, in the ordinary courts of justice, with such notice to the
person, or such proceeding in regard to the property as is appropriate to the nature
of the case, the judgment in such proceedings cannot be said to deprive the owner
of his property without due process of law, however obnoxious it may be to other
objections."
' Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 241 (1907) (tax foreclosure where statute pro-
vided for personal service on residents and notice by publication as to nonresi-
dents) ; Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79 (1904) (tax foreclosure where owner miss-
ing) ; Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316 (1890) (judicial tax sale after notice by
publication to nonresident owner); Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. and Improvement
Co., 130 U. S. 559 (1889) (condemnation of property of nonresident).1 Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. and Improvement Co., 130 U. S. 559 (1889) ; Del
Castillo v. McConnico, 168. U. S. 674, 677 (1898) (dictum).
'North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U. S. 276 (1925) (eminent do-
main) ; Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79 (1903) (taxation). See North Laramie Land
Co. v. Hoffman, supra at 283: "All persons are charged with knowledge of statutes
and must take note of the procedure adopted by them and when that procedure is
not unreasonable or arbitrary there are no constitutional limitations relieving them
from conforming to it. This is especially the case with respect to those statutes
relating to the taxation or condemnation of land."
'Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112, 114 (1956).
10351 U. S. 141 (1956).
"N. Y. TAx LAW § 165-h.
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the property owner to be an unprotected incompetent and unable to
understand the nature of the proceedings. 12 Thus a subjective standard
of due process was used in an area in which it had formerly been con-
sidered necessary to have a fixed a minimum standard of notice for pur-
poses of certainty and efficiency in governmental operation.
Despite what appears to be an important change in the Supreme
Court's attitude toward notice requirements, neither the Walker nor the
Covey decision expressly overruled prior decisions. In the former case the
Court went to some length to distinguish a similar eminent domain case,
Hiding v. Kaw Valley Ry. and Improvement Co.,'3 which had approved
published notice. There the landowner whose property was condemned,
was a nonresident,1 4 and the Court in the Walker opinion used this as
the basis for distinquishing this previous case. It is significant, however,
that the Walker opinion itself raises the question of the effect which
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company15 may have had
on the validity of this distinction, suggesting that the earlier holdings
may have been "undermined."' 6
The Mullane case arose under a New York act 17 providing for notice
by newspaper publication of judicial settlements of common trust fund
accounts. The Court in deciding the case made no distinction between
residents and nonresidents, but held published notice sufficient as to
beneficiaries of the trust whose names and addresses were not known.
However, as to those whose names and addresses were listed on trust
company records, this notice was considered insufficient to satisfy the
requirements of due process of law. Publication, it was said, is not
likely to apprise anyone of the pendency of an action, but the mails, on
the other hand, are an efficient and inexpensive means of informing
those persons who are known to have an interest.'8
The Mullane opinion was also notable for the Court's refusal to
designate the proceeding as one either in personam or in rem. Even
though there had been no clear holding of the United States Supreme
Court to affirm the doctrine, it was generally considered that any action
which could be classified as an in rem proceeding was one in which
" Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U. S. 141, 146 (1956).
130 U. S. 559 (1889).
14 The Supreme Court had indicated a reason for a different standard of notice
as to nonresidents in Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. and Improvement Co., supra note
13: "It is therefore the duty of the owner of real estate, who is a nonresident, to
take measures that in sofne way he shall be represented when his property is callea1
into requisition; and if he fails to do this, and fails to get notice by the ordinary
publications which have usually been required in such cases, it is his misfortune,
and he must abide the consequences." See Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 241, 248(1906).
1339 U. S. 306 (1950).
10 Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112, 114 (1956).
'
7 N. Y. BANKING LAw § 100-c(12).
M ullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 310 (1950).
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constructive service of process would suffice.' 9 Yet because the classifica-
tion of actions as in rem or in personam is based on confused and elusive
standards which vary from state to state, the Court in the Mullane case
felt that the power of the state to resort to constructive service should
no rest on this scheme.
2 0
Justice Jackson, in writing the opinion, carefully noted that the
Court did not commit itself to any formula for "determining when con-
structive notice may be utilized or what test it must meet."21 Neverthe-
less, twice in the past year, in the Covey and Walker cases, the Court
has called up the Mullane case as authority in its examination of statutory
notice requirements. Thus it appears that the present court has estab-
lished the criterion "that if feasible, notice must be reasonably calcu-
lated to inform parties of proceedings which may directly and adversely
effect their legally protected interests. '22
Reading the Mullane, Covey and Walker cases together, it appears
that the elements of notice satisfactory to due process of law are to be
determined by the peculiar facts of each individual case, and that set
rules in the field of constructive notice will no longer be given recogni-
tion. As in other areas,23 it seems that the Court is substituting a sub-
jective standard of due process for the prior standards which, on the
surface at least, embodied greater objectivity and certainty.
The Mullane case in 1950 started a rash of speculation 24 that the
" In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1878), Justice Field drew a distinction
between the notice required for in personam and in rem actions. The Court said
that in personam judgments based upon publication of process would be "instru-
ments of oppression," and suggested by way of dictum that constructive service by
publication "may answer in all actions which are substantially in rem." Id. at
727. Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79 (1903), sustained a Nebraska statute providing
for notice by publication of in rem proceedings to forclose tax liens, and discussed
the classification at length: "When proceedings are in personam . . .the person
must be served with process; in proceeding to reach the thing, service upon it and
such proclamation by publication as gives opportunity to be heard upon application
is sufficient to enable the Court to render judgment." Id. at 85. And, Grannis v.
Ordean, 234 U. S. 380, 384 (1913), noted that in determining what is due process
"a distinction is to be observed between actions in personam and actions in rem or
quasi in rem." The distinction however, was not germane to the holding in this
instance. See Fraser, Actions in Rein, 34 CoRN. L. Q. 29, 40 (1948), where this
authority explained: "Notice in actions in rem is to be distinguished from service
of process in actions in personam because notice may be given a person even
though he is outside the territorial limits of the court, since jurisdiction over the
person is not necessary in actions in rem." See also 1 NIcHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN§ 4.103[2] (1950).
20 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 312 (1950).21 Id. at 314.2 Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112, 114 (1956).
23 E.g., the manner in which the Court determines if due process of law has
been satisfied in criminal cases: Breithaupt v. Abram, 77 Sup. Ct. 408 (1957);
Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128 (1954); Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165
(1951) ; Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 (1944). The Court in these cases
said that under the Due Process Clause, it may nullify a state law if its application
"shocks the conscience," or offends "a sense of justice."
2 Fraser, Jurisdiction by Necessity-An Analysis of the Mullane Case, 100 U.
19571
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validity of state statutes and court rules relating to notice by publication
would be limited, especially as applied in probate proceedings and other
actions similar to common trust settlements. This was followed by
statutory changes2 5 varying considerably in their provisions and in the
scope of their coverage. The Walker decision calls for a close reexamina-
tion of notice requirements in all of the states, and for provision to be
made for at least a letter in all cases where an address is available.2 0
JOHN L. DAVIDSON.
Credit Transactions-Deficiency Judgment Statute-Suit on the Note
In Fleishel v. Jessup,1 plaintiff was holder of promissory notes se-
cured by deed of trust executed by defendant for the purchase price of-
land, equipment, and machinery. After sale, plaintiff sued for deficiency
judgment. The trial court excluded defendant's evidence bearing on the
question of whether certain structures were real or personal property.
Judgment for plaintiff was reversed on appeal on the ground that de-
fendant was entitled to have the jury decide the question of what pro-
portion of the value of all the property was realty.2 As to such pro-
portion plaintiff was not entitled to deficiency judgment under G. S.
§ 45-21.38.3
PA. L. REV. 305 (1952); Hayward, The Effect of Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank and Trust Company Upon Publication of Notice in Iowa, 36 IoWA L. REV.
47 (1950); Tilley, The Mullane Case: New Notice Requirements, 30 MicH. ST.
B. J. 12 (1951).
-1 IowA RULES Civ. P., Rule 60 (1943) (revised in 1951 so that now in all cases
of service of original notice upon known persons by publication, a copy of the notice
must be sent by ordinary mail to such person) ; ME. REV. STAT. 114 § 7 (1954)
(common trust fund statute whose notice provisions were influenced by the Mullane
case) ; MICH. STAT. ANO. § 27.3178(32) (1943) (revised in 1951 to require mail-
ing of all probate and other legal notices) ; OKLA. STAT. ANxO. TITLE 60 § 162
(Supp. 1951) (common trust fund statute).
". Quaere the validity of N. C. GEx. STAT. § 105-377 (1950), which states:
"All persons who have or may acquire any interest in any property which may or
may become subject to a lien for taxes are hereby charged with notice .... Such
notice shall be conclusively presumed, whether such persons have actual notice or
not." Also, N. C. GEN. STAT. § 160-219 (1952), providing for notice by publication
as to property owners who are nonresidents of the state when condemnation pro-
ceedings are brought by a municipal corporation.
1244 N. C. 451, 94 S. E. 2d 308 (1956).
2 The court points out that as between vendor and vendee, personal property
affixed to land passes by a conveyance of the land unless expressly excepted. Horne
v. Smith, 105 N. C. 322, 11 S. E. 373 (1890) (engine and boiler connected to main
building of saw mill); Moore v. Valentine, 77 N. C. 188 (1877) (mining ma-
chinery) ; Bryan v. Lawrence, 50 N. C. 337 (1858) (planks laid down, but not
nailed, on the upper floor of gin house). As between landlord and tenant, fixtures
placed on the land for purposes of trade are removable by the tenant at the expira-
tion of the term without provision in the lease for removal. Springs v. Atlantic
Refining Co., 205 N. C. 444, 171 S. E. 635 (1933), Note, 12 N. C. L. REV. 273
(1934).
'Cf. CALIF. CODE Civ. PROC. § 580 (b) (1955), which provides that where both
a chattel mortgage and real estate deed of trust are given to secure payment of the
balance of the combined purchase price of real and personal property, no deficiency
[Vol. 35
